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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
DE VERE COOLEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
15339 
This case is a· criminal action being prosecuted 
against the Defendant, who is charged with the crime of 
failing to stop his vehicle at the command of a police 
officer, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10, 1953 as amended. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The State's Information was dismissed by the lower 
Court pursuant to Defendant'. s Hot ion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the lower 
Court granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Informa: 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case were stipulated to by the par 
ties, and are set out briefly as follows. Defendant was 
arrested on May 21, 1977, by Officer Donnell R. Kidder 0; 
the Panguitch City Police Department. Officer Kidder is1. 
two citations to the Defendant, copies of which were admi: 
ted in evidence (T3). The first ticket given to the Deft: 
dant was t1'607, which charged him with failing to stop his 
vehicle at the command of a police officer. The Officer 
also issued ticket 4fa608, which charged the Defendant with 
two offenses, (1) no tail lights on a boat trailer, anH 
driving under an improper or restricted license. Defent 
appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court of Panguitch 
Precinct, Garfield County, State of Utah, and entered an 
- 2 -
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of guilty to both offenses charged on ticket #608. The 
prosecution in the case before the Court is based on the 
offense charged in ticket #607 (T3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I: THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT UPON A MOTION TO 
DISMISS THE INFORMATION AND IS ALLOWED UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-39-4(1), 1953. 
Under present Utah Law, the State is allowed to appeal 
on any one of four different grounds. The grounds are: (1) 
from a judgment of dismissal in favor of the Defendant on a 
Motion to Quash the Information or Indictment; or (2) from 
an Order Arresting Judgment; or (3) from an Order made 
after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the 
State; or (4) from an Order of the court directing the jury 
to find for the Defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4, 1953. 
The Order appealed from is couched in terms of the 
State's case having been "dismissed" rather than "quashed". 
Nevertheless, a Dismissal With Prejudice amounts to a quash-
ing of the entire proceeding, including the Information. 
See especially the language of Justice Crockett in his 
dissenting opinion in State vs. Davenport, 517 P. 2d 544, 30 
Utah 2d 298(1973): 
"It does not seem to me open to question but that the 
essential effect of the granting of the motion to 
dismiss by the trial court amounted to a quashing of 
the entire proceeding, and this of course includes the 
quashing of the information." 
- 3 -
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See also State vs. Rickenberg, 58 Utah 2d 270, 198 P. 76 , 
POINT NO. II: THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, SINCE THE OFFENSE UP 
C. 
WHICH THE INSTANT PROSECUTION IS BASED IS NOT WITH!:; 
THE JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE COURT. 
After reviewing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, 1953 as 
amended, the Court below granted Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. That statute provides a bar to subsequent pro51 
tions for offenses arising out of a single criminal episc: 
if certain conditions are met. Basically, former prosecc· 
tions are subjected to a two-part test to determine if 
subsequen:: prosecutions are barred. In this matter, the 
parties have stipulated that Defendant's conduct constit1;: 
a single criminal episode. 
For the sake of simplicity, the second part of the'· 
part test will be argued first herein. The second part c: 
the test provides that a subsequent prosecution is barrec 
a former prosecution was terminated by any one of four 
different results. Those results are (1) acquittal, (1) 
conviction, (3) improper termination, or ( 4) conviction 
under a statute inconsistent with the one upon which the 
subsequent prosecution is based. 
In this matter, the former prosecution resulted in 
conviction. The State has stipulated that the Defend2n· 
appeared and entered a plea of guilty to the two ofk' 
- 4 -
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charged in ticket #608. Therefore, the second part of the 
two-part test has been met. 
The first part of the two-part test refers to the 
preceding code section. Briefly, the first part of the two-
part test is that the subsequent prosecution not be for an 
offense that should have been tried under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402(2), 1953 as amended. That statute. provides that a 
Defendant must be allowed a combined trial for all offenses 
arising out of a single episode if: (1) the offenses are 
within the jurisdiction of a single court, and (2) the 
offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time 
the Defendant is arraigned. The State's position is that 
the offenses arising out of this criminal episode were not 
all within the jurisdiction of a single court. 
The offense of operating a boat trailer with no tail 
lamps is a Class B Misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-
120(a) and 41-6-164, 1953 as amended. The offense of 
operating a motor vehicle with an improper or restricted 
license is also a Class B Misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 41-2-28 and 41-2-30, 1953. 
Class B Misdemeanor offenses are within the jurisdic-
tion of the Justice Courts of this state. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-S-4(l)(a), 1953 as amended. 
The offense of failing to stop one's vehicle at the 
cormnand of a police officer is a Class A Misdemeanor. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10, 1953 as amended. 
- 5 -
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Class A Misdemeanor offenses are within the jurisdic. 
tion of the District Courts of this state. Utah Code Ann. 
78-3-4, 1953 as amended. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the State's argument is that subsequent 
prosecutions for offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode are barred if the former prosecution meets a two. 
part test. The two-part test is (1) that the former prose· 
cution resulted in acquittal, conviction, improper termi
111
• 
tion, or conviction under a statute inconsistent with the 
one being prosecuted, and (2) that the subsequent prosecu· 
tion is for an offense which lies within the jurisdiction 
a single court and is for an offense known to the prosecu· 
ting attorney at the time the Defendant is arraigned. In 
this case, the Defendant met the second part of the two·ii 
test, because the former prosecution resulted in convicti 
However, Defendant did not meet the first part of the two 
part test, because the former prosecution was for offens1 
whose jurisdiction did not lie in a single court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID L. MOWER 
Garfield County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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